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Abstract
Italy has the lowest labor force participation of women among OECD countries.
Moreover, the participation rate of married women is positively correlated to their
husbands' income. We show that a high tax schedule together with tax credits
and transfers raise the burden of two-earner households, generating disincentives to
work. We estimate a structural labor supply model for women, and use the estimated
parameters to simulate the eects of alternative revenue-neutral tax systems. We nd
that joint taxation implies a drop in the participation rate. Conversely, working tax
credit and gender-based taxation boost it, with the eects of the former concentrated
on low educated women.
Keywords: female labor force participation, Italian tax system, marginal tax rate,
joint taxation, gender-based taxation, working tax credit
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The labor force participation of Italian women is the lowest among OECD coun-
tries. Moreover, while the labor force participation of married women is usually
negatively correlated to their husband's income, in Italy the correlation is positive.
In this paper, we argue that the taxation system partly explains the coexistence of
these two features.
Our interest in this topic is motivated by the anemic growth rate of the Italian
economy over the last decade. A low labor force participation is an immediate expla-
nation for a stagnant GDP, especially when combined with a declining population.
But there is also a public policy issue: if whatever makes Italy's participation rate
low involves a distortion rather than a choice, then there is room for improvement
in both income and welfare. These considerations are in line with Europe2020, the
European Union Commission's growth strategy1 that targets ve objectives on em-
ployment, innovation, education, social inclusion and climate/energy by 2020. In
particular, Italy has set the target for the employment rate to 67-69 percent, imply-
ing an increase of about 6 percentage points. Moreover, Italy has committed to a
decrease of about 2.2 million of people at-risk-of-poverty, meaning a reduction of 18
percent of the population in this critical situation.2
In order to reach these objectives, it is crucial to identify reforms that promote
labor force participation in the short-term, mainly for those groups of population
1A detailed description can be found here: http://ec.europa.eu/europe2020/index_en.htm.
2In 2008, the population at-risk-of-poverty in Italy was 19 percent of the total, that is about 12
million of people. See http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/cache/ITY_OFFPUB/KS-SF-10-009/
EN/KS-SF-10-009-EN.PDF.
2that are not well represented in the labor market. Our work goes in the direction of
suggesting alternative taxation systems that would boost women's participation by
about 3 percentage points, and decrease the percentage of women who are below the
poverty line by up to 1.5 percentage points.
The Italian taxation system is based on an individual tax unit. It is characterized
by a high tax schedule, a set of tax credits for children and for the spouse who is
not employed, as well as cash transfers for dependent children. The combination of
these elements raises the tax burden, especially on two-earner households, generating
disincentives to participate in the labor force for married women, typically the second
earner of the family. Such disincentives are stronger when the rst earner's income
is low. More specically, tax credits and universal cash transfers are decreasing
functions of the household income. This means that their incidence on the marginal
tax rate3 decreases in total income, providing incentives to participate that are higher
for richer households. The marginal tax rate is also increasing in the number of
children, and reaches a maximum at husbands' yearly earnings lower than 20,000
euros. Furthermore, the dierence between the marginal tax rates of married and
unmarried women is large at low incomes, and becomes negligible at higher earnings,
discouraging part-time and low skill jobs.4
We use micro data from the EU-SILC (2007-2008) to estimate a structural model
of labor supply that includes, as main ingredient, the characteristics of the Italian
3We dene the marginal tax as the amount paid on an additional unit of income if the second
earner works relatively to the case in which she is unemployed or out of the labor force.
4While the increase in more favorable conditions of part-time jobs may create incentives for
(married) mothers to participate in the labor market, Manning and Petrongolo (2008) provide
evidence of part-time jobs as potential sources of occupational segregation.
3tax system.5 We model the labor supply decision of women as sequential. First,
they decide whether to search for an occupation, and upon receiving a job oer, they
accept it or not. Men's labor supply and incomes are given. All of the labor decisions
depend on the net yearly income, hence on the characteristics of the taxation system.
The model is able to generate the low level of the participation rate, as well as the
positive correlation between women's participation rate and husbands' income. It
also matches the part-time and full-time employment rates.
Then, we use the estimated parameters to measure the behavioral eects of alter-
native (revenue neutral) tax systems: joint family taxation (in line with the French
system), a system inspired by the (British and American) Working Tax Credit, a
gender-based taxation (as proposed by Alesina et al. (2011)), and a mixture of the
Italian and the joint taxation system. We assume that the simulated tax systems
are characterized by the same taxation rates,6 but dier in the set of tax credits and
transfers.
We show that the joint tax system implies a substantial drop in female labor
participation of married women. In particular, the decrease in the participation rate
is increasing in the husband's income. On the contrary, the working tax credit and
the gender-based system boost the participation rate of all women. The eects of
5In general, the choice of participating in the labor market depends upon several variables. It
reects the value assigned to domestic activities as housework and child care (Olovsson (2009)),
and the amount of wealth owned. Moreover, social norms play an important role in the decision
of women to work, especially in Italy. The World Value Survey reports that 80 percent of the
Italian population, of both genders, thinks that a child younger than 3 years old suers if the
mother works. Even thought we recognize the importance of these variables in determining the
labor supply decision, we do not include them in our analysis.
6The gender-based taxation is assumed to have a lower tax schedule for women.
4the former concentrates on unskilled and low educated women (and hence, low skill
and part-time jobs). In the latter, the reduced tax rates generate a positive shift of
the participation rate. But, the tax credits for dependent spouse and children leave
unchanged the negative incentives for low income households. The mixture system
allows to choose the taxation system that implies the lowest tax burden. The eects
on the labor force participation and employment are intermediary between those
produced by the two systems separately. The Italian system is chosen for low levels
of income, as it gives right to receive tax credits and transfers for the children. For
higher incomes, households prefer the joint taxation system, as they benet from the
quotient familial.7
Finally, we compare the eects on welfare of these systems by computing several
poverty measures for the women in the sample. We show that the gender-based
system increases the well-being of unmarried women, reducing the transfer needed
to reach the poverty line. On the contrary, married women are better o in the
mixture system.
Our paper is placed in the context of three main strands of literature. First, it
relates to recent works which argue that the taxation system may create a system
of incentives to labor force participation, and that it may play an important role
in explaining cross-country dierences in labor supply behavior. Some examples are
Prescott (2004), Davis and Henrekson (2004), Rogerson (2006), and Olovsson (2009).
7The quotient familial has been adopted in France since 1945. It aims to make the amount of
the income tax proportional to households' ability to pay. It consists of a coecient by which the
total household revenue has to be divided. It is a function of the number of household components,
and each member has a dierent weight depending on being adult or child. See Saint-Jaques (2009)
for a detailed description of the French system.
5Second, our work belongs to the rich stream of the empirical labor supply analysis,
both for the U.S. and Europe. A fundamental role in addressing the relevance of
taxation has been played by Burtless and Hausman (1978), Hausman (1980), and
Hausman (1985). Our paper uses a framework similar to Colombino and Del Boca
(1990). We enrich their results by showing that the model is able to reproduce
the positive correlation between wife's labor force participation rate and husband's
income. Moreover, in the statistical procedure for the wage prediction, we correct
for selection bias using a non-linear method which accounts for the probability that
an individual with given characteristics opts for a certain labor supply choice.
Third, several studies examine the eect of tax reforms on labor force partic-
ipation. Up to twenty years ago, the theoretical literature on taxation converged
to an optimal scenario characterized by a basic income transfer and an almost at
income tax. More recently, the literature focused on in-work benets (Colombino
et al. (2000), Saez (2002), Immervoll et al. (2007), Mooij (2008), and Blundell et al.
(2011)). Several studies have evaluated the expected labor supply eects from in-
troducing in-work tax credits in the U.S. and U.K. The most recent and relevant
studies are for the U.K. Blundell et al. (2000) and Blundell and Hoynes (2003), and
for the U.S. Meyer and Rosenbaum (2001) and Fang and Keane (2004). The results
from these studies suggest that there are strong incentive eects from tax credits.
The broadening of the tax credit seems to have contributed to increased labor force
participation and reduced welfare participation. Our results are also consistent with
the ndings of Eissa and Liebman (1996), Cavalli and Fiorio (2006), and Bar and
Leukhina (2009).
6This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we provide a description of the
Italian labor market and taxation system. In Section 3, we specify the empirical
strategy, we describe the data, and present the results. In Section 4, we measure
the behavioral eects of alternative tax systems. Section 5 concludes. Tables and
Figures are relegated to the Appendix.
2. Labor Market and Taxation System in Italy
2.1. Empirical Evidence
In this section, we describe the main characteristics of the Italian labor market
in 2007-2008, and how it diers from the rest of OECD countries.
In Table D.5, we can see that, on average, about 70 percent of women aged 26-54
years old are employed. The number is over 85 percent for men. There are large
cross-country dierences in the gender gap, which is lower than 10 percentage points
in U.K. and U.S. Italy stands out for a gender employment gap of over 20 percentage
points, and for the lowest employment rate of women, that is about 6 percentage
points lower than the average.
There are also gender gaps in the intensity of employment participation. In all of
the countries, a much larger share of female employment is part-time when compared
to male employment, with an average of 34 percent for women, and only 5 percent for
men. While the largest gap in the share of part-time/full-time employment among
men and women is over 40 percent, in Italy, the gender gap is lower than the average
of the countries.
The gender gap is very large in the general participation rate. Italy has the lowest
7participation rate of women, and a gender participation gap of about 24 percentage
points against an average gap of 17 percentage points. The marital status consider-
ably aects the decision to participate, with married women having a participation
rate that is about 10 percentage points lower than unmarried women. Moreover,
participation rates tend to be lower for mothers. On average, 73 percent of married
mothers are in the labor force, but only 64 percent in Italy.8
Another important feature of the Italian labor market can be observed in Figure
C.2, where we can see that the labor force participation of married women is posi-
tively correlated to their husbands' yearly income. This is in contrast with the other
countries, where the labor force participation appears to be inelastic. To the best of
our knowledge, this characteristics of the Italian labor force participation of married
women has not been explored in the literature, and is one of the facts that strongly
motivated our project.
To get a measure of the correlation between the labor force participation of mar-
ried women and the various demographic variables available in the EU-SILC and
IPUMS USA dataset9, we run a simple probit regression of this kind:
Pr(Y = 1jX) = (X
0)
where Pr(Y = 1jX) denotes the conditional probability of participating in the labor
market,  is the cumulative distribution function of the standard normal distribution,
8From Figure C.1, we can see that the gap in participation of married and unmarried Italian
women persists during the life-cycle, especially for those who have children.
9The description of the data can be found in Section 3.2 and in the Appendix.
8and the parameters  are estimated by maximum likelihood. The vector of controls
X includes information on the (logarithm of the) yearly income of husbands, number
of children, age of the wife, and years of schooling. We also add year xed eects.
We run a separate regression for Italy and the rest of the countries considered in our
data analysis.
Results are in Table D.7. Note that, the signs of the coecients on the number
of children, and years of schooling are consistent across countries. The presence of
children decreases the probability of participating in the labor market, while the
years of schooling have a positive eect. Italy, however, behaves dierently than
other countries in the correlation between husband's income and labor force partici-
pation: a signicative positive elasticity of 0.032 characterizes Italian data, versus a
negative elasticity which ranges from 0.201 (in Germany) to 0.032 (in the U.K.) for
the remaining countries.
In summary, the Italian labor market exhibits distinctive features. There is a
disparity between men and women in the participation rate, mainly regarding mar-
ried couples. Once employed, Italian women are more likely than men to have a
part-time job (or a temporary contract), but this probability is lower than in other
OECD countries. In what follows, we bridge these facts to the Italian tax system.
2.2. The Italian Tax System
In this section, we describe the main characteristics of the Italian taxation system.
More technical details can be found in the Appendix.
We dene the second earner of a household as the worker with the highest elas-
ticity of labor supply to income. Generally, in a married couple, the husband is
9considered to be the rst earner, who participates to the labor market with cer-
tainty. The wife is the second earner. Her decision to participate depends on several
economic and non economic variables. In particular, it depends on the fraction of
her expected gross income that will be disposable, net of total taxes. To understand
the impact of taxes on the decision to work, we make use of the concept of marginal
tax rate (or second earner tax rate).
Let us dene the marginal tax rate as follows:






where Tax1 and Tax0 are the total income taxes paid by the household if the wife
works (Tax1) and if she does not work (Tax0). I1 is the gross household income
when she works, and I0 if she does not work (i.e. she is either out of the labor force
or unemployed).
Now, depending on the unit of the scal system (individual or family), the
marginal tax rate and the average tax rate10 of a married woman may be signi-
cantly dierent than those of an unmarried woman.
In Italy, however, we should not observe a marital status dependence of the
amount of tax paid, because the tax system is based on the individual and not on
the household. Nevertheless, tax credits for family dependents and universal cash
transfers for children are decreasing functions of the household income and indirectly
aect the scal burden related to the labor force participation status of the wife.
10That is, the ratio between the total household taxes and the gross household income.
10Let us illustrate the mechanism put at work by the tax credits and universal cash
transfers. Since 2007, the tax system grants a tax credit for dependent spouse who
earns less than 2;840:51 euros a year, a very low labor income. The amount of tax
credits for dependent spouse varies between 0 and 730 euros depending on the total
household's income.
Consider the following examples:
(1) Assume that an unmarried woman (not currently employed) receives an oer
to work part-time earning 7;200 euros a year. As the current taxation system
includes a no-tax area for yearly income lower than 8;000 euros, her net dispos-
able income would increase of 7;200 euros a year. She would pay a marginal
tax rate of 0.
(2) Assume now that this same woman is married to an employed man earning
35;000 euros a year. The tax credit system would grant 720 euros to the
household if she did not work. If she were to accept the job oer, she would
not depend on the husband anymore, and he would not receive the tax credit.
The household disposable income would not increase by 7;200 euros a year,
but by 6;480 euros a year, i.e. (7;200   720). She would pay a marginal tax
rate equal to 10 percent (720=7;200).
(3) Assume the husband earns 50;000 euros a year. The tax credit system would
grant 517:50 euros to the household if she did not work. She would pay a
marginal tax rate equal to 7:18 percent (517:50=7;200).
(4) Assume the husband earns 100;000 euros a year. He would not receive the tax
11credit and the marginal tax rate would be zero.
These examples show that the amount of tax credits decrease with the total
household income, and it is zero for incomes higher than 95;000 euros a year. The
universal cash transfers for children put a similar mechanism at work in married
households. On the contrary, they have the positive eect of reducing the scal
burden of unmarried mothers, and create positive incentives to their participation
rate (as in example (1)).
Figure C.3 plots the marginal tax rates on earnings of women for dierent levels
of gross yearly earnings. The gures in the left column plot the marginal tax rates
against women's gross yearly earnings, at a given level of husbands' gross yearly
earnings of 40,000 euros. The gures in the right column plot the marginal tax
rate on earnings against husbands' gross yearly earnings, at a level of women's gross
yearly earnings of 40,000 euros. The top panel is for women without children, and
the bottom panel is for women with two dependent children.
In panel a), we can see that the married-unmarried dierence in marginal tax
rates is particularly relevant for low women's earnings, and dies down as the income
increases. The pick of the marginal tax of married women occurs in correspondence
to a yearly earning of about 3;000 euros. At that point, husbands are not entitled to
receive a tax credit for dependent spouse, and the marginal tax rate jumps from 0
to about 30 percent. These couples face a trade-o between having the wife partic-
ipating in the labor market earning a very low salary and not receiving tax credits
(but still increasing the total household income), versus not participating and paying
lower taxes (because of the tax credits).
12In panel b), the marginal tax rate of married women is constant and equal to the
one of unmarried women, until a level of husband's income of about 8,000 euros. In
the interval [0;8;000] euros, the husband's income belongs to the no-tax area, and
only his wife's earnings are subject to taxation. After that point, both incomes are
taxed and the marginal tax increases to about 35 percent.
In panel c) and d), we plot the marginal tax rates of households with children.
In panel c), we can see that low earnings unmarried mothers are subject to negative
taxation, as they are eligible to universal cash transfers for dependent children, which
are higher than the amount of taxes that they are supposed to pay. Married mothers
are subject to a higher marginal tax because of the (lower) amount of universal
cash transfers for dependent children agreed to the husband. As earnings increase,
the dierence between the tax paid by married and unmarried women decreases.
In panel d), we can see more clearly the impact of the universal cash transfers for
dependent children. The marginal tax rate of married mothers is increasing up to
yearly household earnings of about 60,000 euros. After that point, households are
not entitled to receive transfers, and the marginal tax rate decreases.
Now, we take a closer look at the impact of taxes by presence of children (Fig-
ure C.4), and by marital status (Figure C.5). In Figure C.4, we compare the eect
of having or not children by marital status. In panel a), we observe that unmar-
ried women with children have a marginal tax rate which is much lower than that
of unmarried women without children, as the former receive cash transfers for the
dependent children. For married women (panel b)), the presence of children does
not aect the marginal tax rate when the household income is low. Conversely, for
13medium and high incomes, the marginal tax rate is slightly higher for households
with children, because of the universal cash transfers. Figure C.5 plots the dierence
of marginal tax rates between married and unmarried women by presence of children,
against their yearly earnings. The dierence is signicatively positive for low-income
mothers whose husbands are entitled to receive tax credits and transfers. But it is
very close to zero for higher incomes and, in general, for childless women.
In summary, the Italian tax system, even if based on individuals and not on
households, generates a set of negative incentives to female labor force participation.
This is due to universal cash transfers and tax credits for dependent children and
spouse that increase the marginal tax of married relative to unmarried women. The
distortion is increasing in the number of children, and reaches a maximum at a level
of husband's yearly earnings of about 10;000 to 20;000 euros.
Having discussed the empirical features that motivate our work, we present, in
the next section, the model and the results of the estimations.
3. Estimation and Results
3.1. The Model and the Empirical Specication
We build a two-stage model of female labor supply. In the rst stage, a woman
decides whether to join the labor market and search for a job. If she does, she
will enter the second stage and receive, for each possible amount of work time,
h 2 H  <+ a job oer characterized by a level of gross yearly earning wf(h). She
can accept one of them or reject them all and stay unemployed (h = 0).
We denote with wm(h) the husband gross earnings (which is 0 if the woman is not
14married) and with y the household gross income coming from other sources. Both
wm(h) and y are taken as given. We assume that consumption equates disposable
income
c = D(wf(h);wm;y;d) = wf(h) + wm + y   T(wf(h);wm;y;d);
where T() are net transfers from the government, given by the dierence between
taxes and benets. They are functions of total income, and of a set of demographic
variables d including, for instance, the number of dependent children.
Household preferences are described by a stochastic utility functions Um
h (c;X),
with m denoting marital status (0 for unmarried, 1 for married), c the household
consumption and X, a set of individual variables. Notice that the shape of the utility
function is allowed to vary also with labor supply h.
We solve the problem by backward induction, starting from stage 2. A woman






In the second stage, a woman faces a trade-o between the utility from non working
(enjoying leisure and carrying out domestic work) and working, augmenting the
disposable income of the household.
In stage 1, the agent decides whether or not to enter the labor market. The
15problem is the following:
max
s Us(wm;y;d;X) = maxfU 1(wm;y;d;X);E [U(wm;y;d;X)]g;
where s = f 1;0g denotes the out of/in the labor market state, and Us() the utility
associated. Here, the utility of being in the labor market is E [U(wm;y;d;X)], that
is the expected utility generated by the maximization problem in stage 2. To make
her choice, she compares the utility from not participating and the expected utility
from entering the labor market.
We assume a quadratic utility function:
U
m


























Notice that the marginal utility of income depends on marital status. Moreover, the
eect of all other variables included in X varies with both m and h.
The dierence (m
h  m
0 ) captures the disutility of working (utility of leisure) for
an amount of time h, and (m
0  m
 1) is the disutility of searching for a job. Finally,
h is a stochastic error component.
We know that, if  is iid according to a type I extreme value distribution, the
probability of observing a woman in the labor market, opting for a choice h = k is




16Similarly, the probability of being (or not being) in the labor market is P(s = 0) (or
P(s =  1))
P(s = 0) =
eE[U(wm;y;d;X)]
eU 1(wm;y;d;X) + E [U(wm;y;d;X)]
P(s =  1) =
eU 1(wm;y;d;X)
eU 1(wm;y;d;X) + E [U(wm;y;d;X)]
Finally, for a given observation sample fzigi2I = fwmi;wfi(h);yi;hi;si;di;Xigi2I, we






















where 1k(hi) is a binary variable which equals 1 if individual i chooses h = k and 0
otherwise.
3.2. The Data
We use micro data from the EU-SILC, the Community Statistics on Income
and Living Conditions. The survey collects information relating to a broad range of
issues in relation to income and living conditions. SILC is conducted by the Statistics
Oces of the European countries involved in the project on an annual basis, in order
17to monitor changes in income and living conditions over time.
Every person aged sixteen years and over in a household is required to partic-
ipate to the survey. Two dierent types of questions are asked in the household
survey: household questions, and personal questions. The former covers details of
accommodation and facilities together with regular household expenses (mortgage
repayments, etc.). This information is supplied by the Head of the Household. The
latter covers details of items such as work, income and health, and are obtained from
every household member aged 16 years and over. We combine household and per-
sonal information to construct a data set which contains information on the spouse
of the interviewed household member.
We focus on the cross-sectional information11 of the years 2007 and 2008, because
they are the last two years available of EU-SILC after a few changes in the tax system
that took place from 2006 to 2007. We restrict the sample to women aged 26-54 years,
to avoid the modeling of schooling and retirement decisions. Descriptive statistics
are in Table B.3.
The data set provides information on gross labor income of all members of the
household (wm,wf), and total household income. By dierence it is possible to
compute non-labor income (y). Nevertheless, it is necessary to compute potential
income for all possible labor supply choices h 2 H, including the non-employed. To
correct for selection bias, a two-stage non-linear procedure is adopted which diers
11EU-SILC provides two types of data: (1) cross-sectional data pertaining to a given time or a
certain time period with variables on income, poverty, social exclusion and other living conditions;
(2) longitudinal data pertaining to individual-level changes over time, observed periodically over a
four years period.
18in few features from the standard Heckman correction.
In the rst stage, the propensity scores qk(Z) = Pr(h = kjZ) are estimated
by a standard probit procedure,12 with variables Z including: age, years of work
experience, dummy variables for geographical regions, dummy variables for living
with the parents (if unmarried), presence of dependent children, education, and net
income from other sources (both husbands income, if any, and non labor income).
Unlike the standard Heckman selection procedure, we consider three possible labor
supply choices: h = f0;1;2g, where f0;1;2g denote unemployment, part-time and
full time employment, respectively. Moreover, we distinguish between married and
unmarried women. The marginal eects obtained from the probit regressions are in
Table D.8.
In the second stage, we estimate the wage equation assuming that:
E(wf(h)jX) = X + h(q0(Z);q1(Z);:::;qH(Z));
where X is the set of exogenous variables and  is a given function of the propensity
scores qh(Z). In particular, h() is a function of the percentiles of qh(Z), for h =
f0;1;2g. We use them in the OLS estimation of the wage equation, and report
the coecients in Table D.11. Finally, we use the residuals of the wage equation
estimation to compute the predicted wages for part-time and full-time employment
choices.
12The propensity scores are the probabilities that an individual with characteristic Z opts for
labor supply choice h = k.
193.3. Estimation Results
The model is estimated allowing the parameters to dier between married and
unmarried women. That is, we allow the elasticity of the labor force participation
to change with the marital status. We include several variables that aect the de-
cision to participate in the labor market, as age, education level, years of past work
experience, region of origin, and presence of children.
Figure C.6 plots the estimated participation rates by age, and marital status.
Comparing it to Figure C.1, we can observe that the model generates the levels and
the decreasing trend of the participation rate of the dierent subgroups of women.
Even thought the taxation system is not age-dependent, the age of women is corre-
lated with their own earnings, their husband's earnings, and the number of children.
As we described above, all of these elements aect the tax burden, and hence, the
labor decision of second earners.
The model replicates the percentage of women in the labor force, and the per-
centage of women who are employed (in part-time and full-time jobs). The results
are shown in Figure C.7. In Figure C.8, we plot the participation rates of unmarried
and married women with and without children. Again, the model matches the rates
in all of the subcases. We obtain a similar gure for the employment rates (Figure
C.9). In the last three panels of Table D.12, we summarize the results of the esti-
mation for the labor force participation and the employment rates (part-time and
full-time).
Figure C.10 plots the realized and predicted labor force participation of married
women by percentile of husbands' income. The model slightly overestimates the
20participation rates of women married to husbands in the lowest and in the high-
est percentiles. In Figure C.11, we compare the actual labor force participation
rates with those generated by the model, by husband's income, education level, and
presence of children. Consistently with the dynamics of the marginal tax rate, the
participation rate is relatively high when the husband is unemployed or earns more
than 30,000 euros a year. In addition, the rates are lower in presence of children.
To better understand the role of the taxation system, we estimate a model where
the labor choice of women depends on the yearly gross labor income, and not on
the net income as in the benchmark model. Figure C.12 plots the dierences in
the participation rates produced by the two models, by husband's income. This
counterfactual experiment shows that ignoring the taxation system would produce
a signicative and increasing underestimation of the participation rates of married
women for husbands' incomes higher than 40,000 euros (black columns). This under-
estimation is not signicative for the benchmark model (blank columns). For lower
incomes, the participation rates are signicative overestimated in the model without
tax.
All these results support our hypothesis that the taxation system is partly respon-
sible for generating the positive correlation between husband's income and women
labor force participation.
4. Alternative Taxation Systems
The reform of the taxation system has been a topic of several discussions in the
Italian government. In this section, we use the parameters obtained from the estima-
21tion of the model to simulate the labor force participation rate and the employment
rate under four dierent taxation systems that have been considered in the politi-
cal and academic debate. That is: the joint taxation, the working tax credit, the
gender-based taxation, and a mixture of individual (or Italian) and joint tax system.
In Tables D.9 and D.10, we summarize the main characteristics of these alternative
systems.
The results of the simulations are in Table D.12.13 An important issue involved
in our tax simulation exercises is that, when dierent tax units and tax systems
are considered, the total tax revenue might change. We analyze what happens to
the amount of tax paid by a household in the case of constant total tax revenue.
Constant tax revenue is achieved by increasing each household tax by a constant
amount.14
Moreover, we compute several measures of poverty to compare the eects on the
well-being of individuals for each of the taxation system that we consider.
4.1. Joint Family Taxation
The joint taxation system is currently implemented in Portugal, France and Ger-
many. It provides tax advantages to large families with low income as the average tax
rate decreases with the number of household components. As shown by some existing
13It is worth noting that these are results of a partial equilibrium model where the individuals'
labor choices do not aect labor earnings.
14A simulation that does not take this into account shows that the joint tax system implies a
revenue loss of about 18%; the working tax credit of about 2%; the gender-based system of about
11%.
22literature,15 this system creates a system of negative incentives to participation for
both of the spouses, and especially for women.
We simulate a taxation system similar to the one we nd in France, where the
gross income is the household income divided by the number of parts (the quotient
familial, a coecients which increases with the number of household components).
Let Y1 and Y2 be the gross yearly incomes of the two spouses, q be quotient
familial, and t() be the tax schedule. Then, the amount of tax is equal to qt((Y1 +
Y2)=q) instead of t(Y1)+t(Y2). In the simulation, we drop all tax credits for dependent
spouse and universal cash transfers. The quotient familial is assumed to equal the
number of household components.
As we can see from Table D.12, this tax system implies an increase in the average
tax rate (from 21 to 24 percent), and an even higher increase in the marginal tax rate.
The increase concerns all the marital status, regardless of the presence of children.
Participation and employment rates decrease by about 3 percentage points. Un-
der this system, unmarried women do not change their behavior signicantly. Mar-
ried women are the most negatively aected. In particular, married women without
children decrease their participation rate by 6 percentage points, and married women
with children decrease it by 5 percentage points. In both cases, Figure C.13 shows
that the participation rate is decreasing in husband's income. As shown in Figure
C.14, the marginal tax rate of married women increases in husband's income (panels
b) and d)), and exhibits higher values than the benchmark model (panels a) and c)).
15See Bueteau and Echevin (2003) for France, Steiner and Wrohlich (2004) for Germany, and
Aassve et al. (2007) for Italy.
23The reason is that, without tax credits and universal cash transfers, the marginal tax
rate of the second earner is now equal to q[t((Y1+Y2)=q) t(Y1=q)]=Y2, which is pos-
itive for every Y1  Y2, and increasing in the dierence (Y1   Y2). The employment
rate, both part-time and full-time, shows a similar pattern (see Table D.12).
4.2. The Working Tax Credit
The American Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) and the British Working Tax
Credit (WTC) are two systems of negative taxation. The tax unit is the individual.
Based on them, households where both of the spouses are employed, have the right
to receive a tax credit which is increasing in the size of the family and which can
even become a transfer.16 Chote et al. (2007) provide evidence of an increase from
45 to 55 percent in employment rates of unmarried mothers in Great Britain. Eissa
and Liebman (1996) and Ellwood (2000) obtain similar results for the EITC.
We assume that individual working tax credits are of the same amount of the
Italian tax credits. Moreover, we eliminate the tax credits for dependent spouse and
we set the universal cash transfers to 137 euros a month for the rst child and 121
euros a month for the following children, regardless of the total household income.17
This proposition is in line with the tax system of several European countries, and
the suggestions of Atkinson (2011) and Levy et al. (2007).
This system provides incentives to married women (see Table D.12 and Figure
C.15), especially when they have children. The model forecasts an increase in partic-
16For example, in the WTC, households with two parents working at least 16 hours a week can
obtain a reimbursement of 80 percent of the child care costs.
17We assume that the transfers for the rst and second child are equal to the maximum amount
of transfers guaranteed by the Italian tax system in the two cases.
24ipation and employment rates of about 3 percentage points. There is no change for
unmarried women. Contrary to the Italian system, the working tax credit has all of
the characteristics of an individual taxation system. In fact, tax credits or transfers
(and hence, marginal tax rates) do not depend on the spouse's income, and hence
does not vary with the marital status. This is shown in Figure C.16, panels b) and
d), where the marginal tax rates are constant at about 34 percent, and independent
of the marriage. Similarly, panels a) and c) show that the marginal tax rates change
only with women's income.18
Another interesting features of this system is that it provides incentives to un-
dertake low earnings jobs. As we can see in Figure C.16 (panel a) and c)), the
marginal tax rate is particularly low (and even negative) at low levels of earnings.
Additionally, as reported in Table D.12, the working tax credit is the only system
that generates an increase in part-time employment.
4.3. Gender-based Taxation
Alesina et al. (2011) suggest a gender-based taxation system which implies a lower
tax schedule for individuals characterized by a participation rate elastic to income.
In other words, they propose a lower tax rate for women than for men, regardless
of the marital status. They show that this results in a higher participation rate of
women. Moreover, the increase in wives' bargaining power, due to an increase in
their net disposable income, aects the division of labor inside the household in their
favor.
18The marginal tax rates dier by marital status in Table D.12 because we consider the averages
among all women.
25At the same time, the gender-based taxation favors high income women and would
penalize low income men. Furthermore, it would imply an equal treatment of two
single parent families identical in income but dierent in the gender of the parents.
Saint-Paul (2007) underlines that there is not reason to believe that participation rate
of women is always more elastic than that of men. For example, single women, with
and without children, do not behave dierently than men. Alternatively, Saint-Paul
(2007) suggest to apply a lower tax rate to supplemental hours worked, regardless of
the gender.
In the simulation, we apply a 50 percent reduction in the tax rates of women,
and a decrease in the amount of tax credits for dependent spouse and universal cash
transfers. The lower tax rates boost the participation and the employment rate of
all women. In particular, it increases both participation and employment rates by
more than 2 percentage points, regardless of the marital status and the number of
children. However, the tax credits for dependent spouse and cash transfers continue
to generate the positive correlation between labor force participation and husband's
income (see Figure C.17).
From Figure C.18, we can see that this system leads to a decrease in the marginal
tax rate of every woman, even thought it maintains a relatively high marginal tax
rate of low-income married women (as we did not change the system of tax credits
and universal cash transfers).
264.4. Mixture Individual and Joint Tax System
In this system, we allow agents to choose between the Italian and the joint tax
system.19 In other words, they will choose the tax system that implies the lowest
amount of taxes to be paid. Once the net income has been computed, and the tax
system has been chosen, the labor supply choice is estimated as in the previous cases.
The resulting participation and employment rates have values that are interme-
diate between the benchmark model and the simulated joint taxation system. From
Figure C.19, we can see that under this mix system, the labor force participation is
higher than the benchmark for low levels of husband's income, but it is lower than
the benchmark as the husband's income increases. This is especially valid if there
are children in the household. Also, the rates decrease with the husband's income as
in the pure joint taxation model.
These results are driven by the choice of the Italian system for low income house-
holds; as the income increases, households switch to the joint taxation system. More
specically, when the husband's income is higher than 30,000 euros, the preferred
system is the joint taxation. Similarly, unmarried women prefers the Italian system
only at low levels of income. The rational behind these choices is that the Italian
tax system grants tax credits and transfers that lower the tax burden of low income
households. For higher incomes, tax credits and transfers decrease and lose impor-
tance in reducing the tax amount. In these cases, the joint taxation allows families
to get a tax reduction through the \quotient familial", a tool which is independent
19A similar regime is in act in the U.S., where married couples can choose between joint and
individual ling.
27of income. This explains the switch from the benchmark to the joint system at
medium-high levels of household income.
In panels b) and d) of Figure C.20, we can see that the marginal tax rate of mar-
ried women is still increasing in husband's income (as in the joint taxation system).
In panels a), the marginal tax rate of married women is slightly higher than the
benchmark only for incomes lower than 10,000 euros. In panels c), we see that the
marginal tax rate of married mothers behaves exactly as in the pure joint system.
Moreover, the marginal tax rate of unmarried women is lower than the benchmark
only if they have children.
4.5. Welfare Implications
In order to evaluate the welfare eects of the estimated and simulated tax systems,
we compute several measures of poverty. In general, the tax system has a pervasive
impact on poverty, both directly through its role in the distribution of society's
resources, and indirectly through its eects on the incentives for economic decisions
like working and saving. We decide to focus on poverty measures as we think that
the impact of tax reform on low-income families is especially important in light of
the persistence of poverty, wage stagnation at the bottom, and the growth of income
inequality. Our choice is also motivated by the last report of the National Institute
of Statistics of Italy (Istat (2009)), which documents an increase in the poverty
incidence among the households with a worker as reference person.20
In our computations, we dene yi(j) as the equivalised disposable income of in-
20As we mentioned in the introduction, the reduction of the population below the poverty line
is also a target of Europe2020, the project of the European Commission.
28dividual i in household j, that is the total income of a household, after tax and
other deductions, which is available for spending or saving, divided by the number
of household members converted into equalised adults.21 The poverty measures are
dened as follows:
(1) Head count index: it measures the proportion of the population for whom
income is below the poverty line.22 Let s(j) be the number of members of



















1 if yi(j)  P
0 otherwise
The head count index has the disadvantage of ignoring the dierences in well-
being between dierent poor individuals.
(2) Poverty gap: it is the average, over all individuals, of the gaps between the
income of individuals that are below the poverty line and the poverty line. The
21See http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/statistics_explained/index.php/Glossary:
Equivalised_disposable_income.
22The poverty threshold is reported by Eurostat (http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/
statistics_explained/index.php/Main_Page, File: At-risk-of-poverty rate and At risk poverty
threshold in the EU, 2007). In Italy, it equals 9,007 euros in 2007.







[HCi  (P   yi(j))]
(3) Aggregate poverty gap: it measures the average transfer (in euros) to poor





s(j)  max[(P   yi(j));0]
1;000

Both (2) and (3) provide the amount of transfers that have to be transferred to an
individual (2), and to an household (3) to bring their expenditure up to the poverty
line.
The results are in Table D.13. The joint taxation system stands out for the
highest head count index. That is, it implies the highest percentage of women below
the poverty line. The mixture system provides the lowest measures for married
women, which are the lowest percentage of women below the poverty line, and the
lowest transfer necessary to reach the poverty line. The percentage of married women
with children below the poverty line decreases by 0.36 percentage points, and by 0.09
percentage points if they do not have children. Given the income of the husband, the
mixture of Italian and joint tax minimizes the amount of tax to be paid, which turns
out to be lower than the taxes paid in the gender-based system. The gender-based
system decreases the poverty measures for all unmarried women, as it increases the
net yearly income. The decrease is of 1.54 percentage points for women with children,
30and 0.46 for those without children.23
5. Conclusions
In this paper, we have used micro data from EU-SILC to estimate a structural
model of female labor supply. In particular, men's labor supply and incomes are
given, and women decide, in two stages, whether to search for an occupation, and to
accept it or not.
We show that the model matches the low level of the Italian labor force partici-
pation and employment rates, and replicates the positive correlation between wife's
participation rate and husband's yearly income. Moreover, we show that the Italian
individual taxation system generates disincentives to women labor supply, especially
when married with children. This is due to a set of tax credits for dependent spouse
and children, and universal cash transfers for children that increases the scal bur-
den of low income households, and the marginal tax rate of women married to low
income or unemployed men.
We then use the estimated parameters to measure the behavioral eects of alter-
native tax systems: joint family taxation, a system inspired by the British Working
Tax Credit, the gender-based taxation, and a mixture of the Italian and joint taxa-
tion system. We show that the rst implies a substantial drop in the participation
rate of married women. The working tax credit and the gender-based tax systems
23We can think of alternative measures of welfare. One note is important at this point. Given the
assumptions of our model, the labor force participation rate is obtained as probability to participate
in the labor market, given some individual exogenous characteristics. This probability is a monotone
transformation of the utility function. Hence, changes in participation rates reect the directions
of changes in welfare, as computed directly from the model.
31boost the participation rate, with the eects of the former being concentrated on
unskilled and low educated women. Unsurprisingly, the mixture system generates a
set of results that combines those of the Italian and the joint tax systems. The par-
ticipation rate is higher than that produced by the joint tax rate but lower than the
benchmark. Moreover, it generates a negative correlation between the participation
rate and the husband's income, as in the joint tax system.
Overall, the results of the simulations show that moving towards a system of tax
credits in line with the British or the American ones, would reduce the scal burden
of low earnings workers, mostly married women. Cash transfers that are independent
of the total household income would reduce the disincentives to work created by the
Italian taxation system.
We could also expect that providing incentives to low income jobs would decrease
the incentives of taking up irregular jobs.
32Appendix
Appendix A. Details of the Italian Tax System
The methodological information on personal system, compulsory social security
contributions, universal cash transfers, parameter values, and tax equation, are from
OECD (2010).
In the Tables A.1 and A.2, we report the tax schedule, the amounts of tax cred-
its allowed by dierent levels of taxable income, and the amount of universal cash
transfers. The equations for the Italian system (as on page 316 of OECD (2010)),
are mostly repeated for each individual of a married couple. The spouse credit is
relevant only to the calculation for the principal earner.
Table A.1: Italian Taxation System - Tax Schedule, Tax Credits, and Universal Cash
Transfers
Tax Schedule
Bracket (EUR) Rate (%)
Up to 15,000 23
Over 15,001 up to 28,000 27
Over 28,001 up to 55,000 38
Over 55,001 up to 75,000 41
Over 15,001 43
Standard Tax Credits
Level of Taxable Income (EUR) Amount of Tax Credit (EUR)
From 8,001 to 15,000 1,338
From 15,001 to 23,000 1,338
From 23,001 to 24,000 1,348
From 24,001 to 25,000 1,358
From 25,001 to 26,000 1,368
From 26,001 to 27,000 1,378
From 27,001 to 28,000 1,363
From 28,001 to 55,000 1,338
Up to 8,000 1,840
From 8,001 to 15,000 1,338+502*(15,000-Taxable Income)/7,000
From 15,001 to 55,000 Tax Credit*(5,000-Taxable Income)/4,000
Over 55,001 0
33Table A.2: Italian Taxation System - Tax Schedule, Tax Credits, and Universal Cash
Transfers, cont.d
Tax Credits for Family Dependents (earning less than EUR 2,840.51)
Level of Taxable Income (EUR) Amount of Tax Credit (EUR)
Up to 15,000 800-110*Taxable Income/15,000
From 15,001 to 29,000 690
From 29,001 to 29,200 700
From 29,201 to 34,700 710
From 34,701 to 35,000 720
From 35,001 to 35,100 710
From 35,101 to 35,200 700
From 35,201 to 40,000 690
From 40,001 to 80,000 690*(80,000-Taxable Income)/40,000
Over 80,000 0
Tax Credits for Dependent Children
Younger then 3 years old Older than 3 years old
1 child 900*(95,000-Taxable Income)/95,000 800*(95,000-Taxable Income)/95,000
2 children 900*(110,000-Taxable Income)/110,000 800*(110,000-Taxable Income)/110,000
3 children 900*(125,000-Taxable Income)/125,000 900*(125,000-Taxable Income)/125,000




Both parents Max amount (EUR) 137.50 258.33 375.00
Single parent Max amount (EUR) 137.50 258.33 458.33
Max household income (EUR) 65,210 71,445 83,494
There are scal deductions for families that bear child care or other similar costs.
That is:
 it is possible to deduct from the tax amount, the 19% of the kindergarten fees
paid for children younger than 3 years old. The max amount of the deduction
is 632 EUR per child, that is a max of 120 EUR per child;
 it is possible to deduct from the taxable income, the social security contribu-
tions paid for housekeeping services (the max amount is 1,549.37 EUR).
 it is possible to deduct from the tax amount, the 19% of the costs paid for
services related to physically impaired household members, for a maximum
34amount of 2,100 EUR a year.
We do not include these deductions in the model because there is not information
available on EU-SILC data set.
35Appendix B. Summary Statistics
Table B.3: Descriptive statistics, EU-SILC 2007-2008
Variable Women
Unmarried Married
Mean Std.dev. Mean Std.dev.
Number of observation 5,326 12,388
Age 38.11 8.24 42.16 0.63
With children (%) 24.39 73.51
Activity Rate (%) 84.73 62.74
Unemployment Rate (%) 12.36 10.30
Incidence of Part-time (%) 17.65 26.05
Average annual earnings (euros) 14,653.61 13,186.39 14,086.64 12,603.67
Hourly wage rate (euros) 9.49 7.24 9.64 7.82
Non-labor Income (euros) 18,045.01 22042.35 7,665.97 12,365.17








<Secondary School 31.71 43.21
Secondary School 39.34 38.28
> Secondary School 28.95 18.51
36Table B.4: Descriptive statistics, IPUMS USA 2007-2008
Variable Women
Unmarried Married
Mean Std.dev. Mean Std.dev.
Number of observation 314,480 12,388
Age 40.07 8.70 41.53 7.98
With children (%) 40.67 71.00
Activity Rate (%) 80.71 73.97
Unemployment Rate (%) 6.53 3.82
Incidence of Part-time (%) 5.67 10.98
Average annual earnings (US dollars) 36,873.65 38,111.27 36,063.20 34,403.76
Hourly wage rate (US dollars) 19.43 43.85 21.01 111.25
Non-labor Income (US dollars) 3,141.695 16,523.22 4,310.554 15,740.51
Average husband's earnings (US dollars) 57,857.6 66,563.08
Education
<Secondary School 46.02 40.03
Secondary School 25.84 24.81
> Secondary School 28.14 35.16
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44Figure C.8: Labor Force Participation Rate by Marital Status, Presence of Children,
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45Figure C.9: Employment Rate by Marital Status, Presence of Children, and Educa-
tion Level - Data vs Model
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47Figure C.11: Labor Force Participation by Husband's Earnings, Presence of Children,
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49Figure C.13: Labor Force Participation by Husband's Earnings, Presence of Children,
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51Figure C.15: Labor Force Participation by Husband's Earnings, Presence of Children,
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53Figure C.17: Labor Force Participation by Husband's Earnings, Presence of Children,
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55Figure C.19: Labor Force Participation by Husband's Earnings, Presence of Children,
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Table D.5: Labor Statistics for 25-54 years old, by gender, 2007-2008
Employment rates Share in part-time employment
Women Men Women Men
Average 70.18 86.48 33.97 4.83
Germany 77.42 92.13 51.16 5.58
Spain 72.45 92.86 20.24 3.39
France 81.01 93.01 32.72 4.58
Italy 64.00 89.82 22.89 3.71
U.K. 75.82 78.41 38.73 4.69
United States 95.02 95.27 9.10 2.42
Source: Authors' computations from EU-SILC data (2007-2008) and IPUMS USA (2007-2008)
58Table D.6: Labor Force Participation for 25-54 years old, 2007-2008
Married women Unmarried women
Women Men w/children w/o children w/children w/o children
Average 78.75 95.60 73.57 79.47 80.00 88.89
Germany 83.19 97.35 72.50 87.61 90.88 95.00
Spain 78.49 96.31 71.53 71.53 87.01 92.26
France 85.74 97.04 81.28 86.09 87.35 93.96
Italy 71.72 95.58 63.76 65.57 81.53 86.61
U.K. 76.40 79.81 81.83 90.72 71.72 77.13
United States 76.40 87.70 71.53 79.38 82.06 80.11
Source: Authors' computations from EU-SILC data (2007-2008) and IPUMS USA (2007-2008)
59Table D.7: Probit - Coecients
Y = 1 (in labor force) Italy Germany Spain France UK US
log(husband's income) 0.032** -0.201*** -0.084*** -0.096*** -0.032 -0.186***
(0.013) (0.021) (0.021) (0.034) (0.023) (0.002)
Children -0.274*** -0.720*** -0.226*** -0.478*** -0.526*** -0.264***
(0.026) (0.039) (0.032) (0.067) (0.046) (0.004)
Age 0.086*** 0.190*** 0.080*** 0.126*** 0.064*** 0.083***
(0.008) (0.014) (0.011) (0.020) (0.013) (0.002)
Age2 -0.001*** -0.002*** -0.001*** -0.002*** -0.001*** -0.001***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Education:
Secondary School -1.090*** -0.686*** -0.927*** -0.872*** -0.786*** -1.044***
(0.071) (0.054) (0.035) (0.033) (0.062) (0.008)
> Secondary School -0.539*** -0.346*** 0.547*** -0.407*** -0.235*** -0.288***
(0.033) (0.032) (0.040) (0.064) (0.043) (0.003)
Year Fixed Eects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Log likelihood -9406.54 -4564.177 -6021.921 1665.877 -2833.210 -422921.21
Obs. 16036 9235 11349 4141 6717 765408
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Source: Authors' computations from EU-SILC data (2007-2008) and IPUMS USA (2007-2008)
60Table D.8: Probit - Marginal Eects
Unmarried Women Married Women
Dependent variable Y = 1 (in labor force) Y = 1 (employed) Y = 1 (in labor force) Y = 1 (employed)
Age -0.004*** -0.001 -0.001 0.003***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Work experience 0.001 0.001 -0.002** -0.002**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Living with parents -0.051*** -0.132*** - -
(0.012) (0.016) - -
Have children -0.084*** -0.126*** -0.057*** -0.055***
(0.013) (0.017) (0.010) (0.010)
Partner's earnings -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.000***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Non-labor earnings -9.69e-07*** -5.64e-07* -1.76e-06*** -2.16e-06***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Education:
Secondary School 0.108*** 0.183*** 0.170*** 0.190***
(0.008) (0.011) (0.009) (0.010)
> Secondary School 0.133*** 0.203*** 0.297*** 0.337***
(0.008) (0.012) (0.001) (0.013)
Regions:
North-East 0.047*** 0.065*** 0.037*** 0.050***
(0.010) (0.015) (0.013) (0.013)
Center -0.002 -0.046*** -0.027** -0.045***
(0.011) (0.016) (0.013) (0.013)
South -0.123*** -0.286*** -0.199*** -0.256***
(0.016) (0.019) (0.014) (0.013)
Islands -0.112*** -0.307*** -0.253*** -0.289***
(0.022) (0.028) (0.018) (0.017)
Log likelihood -2313.844 -3119.533 -8199.144 -8479.242
Source: Authors' computations from EU-SILC data (2007-2008)
61Table D.11: Wage Equation - OLS, Coecients
Unmarried Women Married Women
Part-time Full-time Part-time Full-time
Age 0.041 -0.014 0.018 -0.032**
(0.038) (0.014) (0.029) (0.014)
Age2 -0.001 0.000 -0.000 0.001***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Partner's age 0.006 -0.010 -0.012* -0.010***
(0.014) (0.005) (0.006) (0.003)
(Partner's age)2 9.67e-06 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Work experience 0.055*** 0.020*** 0.025*** 0.020***
(0.011) (0.004) (0.008) (0.004)
(Work experience)2 -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.000** -0.001***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Partner's Work experience -0.019 0.008 -0.007 0.007*
(0.019) (0.008) (0.006) (0.003)
(Partner's Work experience)2 0.000 -0.000* 0.000 -0.000***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Education:
Primary Education -0.502*** 0.007 -0.775*** -1.275***
(0.162) (0.056) (0.184) (0.102)
Lower Secondary Education -0.607*** 0.191*** -0.732*** -1.077***
(0.133) (0.064) (0.173) (0.093)
Upper Secondary Education -0.183** 0.231*** -0.393*** -0.602***
(0.085) (0.071) (0.103) (0.052)
Tertiary Education 0.218** 0.433*** -0.135** -0.292***
(0.097) (0.070) (0.062) (0.030)
Regions:
North-East 0.167** -0.064** -0.046 -0.033**
(0.070) (0.026) (0.044) (0.025)
Center -0.002*** -0.054* -0.103** -0.155***
(0.070) (0.025) (0.047) (0.025)
South -0.315** -0.145*** -0.408*** -0.506***
(0.123) (0.047) (0.111) (0.059)
Islands -0.220* -0.138** -0.270** -0.404***
(0.134) (0.056) (0.135) (0.071)
Ever worked 0.009 0.016*** 0.010 0.026***
(0.012) (0.004) (0.007) (0.004)
(Ever worked)2 0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Have children -0.128* -0.026 0.062 -0.037
(0.063) (0.025) (0.044) (0.021)
Pctile of Pr(in LFP) yes yes yes yes
Pctile of Pr(in LFP)*Pctile of Pr(empl) yes yes yes yes



























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































64Table D.12: Alternative (Revenue Neutral) Taxation Systems - Results (%)
Unmarried Women Married Women
Taxation Without With Without With All
System children children children children women
Average Tax Rate
Benchmark Model 22.37 7.51 25.07 21.44 21.19
Joint Tax 27.36 16.66 27.82 22.38 24.12
Working Tax Credit 21.54 8.60 24.72 19.61 20.12
Gender-based Tax 17.34 5.09 23.79 21.35 19.30
Mixture Benchmark and Joint 26.99 16.40 27.37 21.87 23.84
Marginal Tax Rate
Benchmark Model 22.37 7.51 24.73 25.41 22.97
Joint Tax 27.36 16.66 36.37 33.26 28.31
Working Tax Credit 21.54 8.60 20.83 18.20 18.78
Gender-based Tax 17.34 5.09 20.56 21.95 19.00
Mixture Benchmark and Joint 26.99 16.40 35.11 30.03 28.95
Participation Rate
Data 86.69 81.09 65.32 61.82 69.48
Benchmark Model 86.43 80.82 65.42 62.05 69.54
Joint Tax 85.69 79.58 58.74 57.19 65.55
Working Tax Credit 86.41 80.60 67.29 65.43 71.62
Gender-based Tax 87.04 81.48 67.27 63.85 71.01
Mixture Benchmark and Joint 86.43 80.87 64.51 57.90 67.24
Employment Rate : Part-time
Data 11.53 18.51 10.67 16.18 14.27
Benchmark Model 11.55 18.35 10.69 16.15 14.25
Joint Tax 11.80 17.42 9.60 14.73 13.31
Working Tax Credit 11.75 18.37 11.15 17.14 14.89
Gender-based Tax 11.15 17.89 10.57 16.14 14.10
Mixture Benchmark and Joint 11.55 18.31 10.41 14.91 13.56
Employment Rate : Full-time
Data 63.05 54.43 49.22 38.87 47.42
Benchmark Model 63.15 54.33 49.07 38.94 47.41
Joint Tax 61.69 53.64 43.62 35.63 44.32
Working Tax Credit 62.94 54.10 50.42 41.16 48.74
Gender-based Tax 64.55 55.64 51.12 40.77 49.15
Mixture Benchmark and Joint 63.15 54.44 48.50 36.17 45.89
Source: Authors' computations from EU-SILC data (2007-2008)
65Table D.13: Poverty Measures - Women
Head count Poverty Aggregate




with children 15.504 442.235 21,030.047
without children 9.459 256.793 9,491.913
Unmarried with children 26.846 1,173.436 7,150.922
without children 11.734 358.895 16,146.328
Joint Tax
Married
with children 16.524 520.412 24,747.667
without children 9.440 256.933 9,499.081
Unmarried with children 27.552 1,195.397 7,284.750
without children 11.834 367.239 16,521.730
Working Tax Credit
Married
with children 16.554 457.929 21,776.337
without children 9.507 249.910 9,239.425
Unmarried with children 26.108 1,105.584 6,737.426
without children 11.458 355.650 16,000.356
Gender-based Tax
Married
with children 15.595 444.291 21,127.818
without children 9.526 257.531 9,521.187
Unmarried with children 25.304 1,086.421 6,620.651
without children 11.274 352.879 15,875.688
Mixture Individual and Joint
Married
with children 15.149 433.812 20,629.489
without children 9.370 248.576 9,190.093
Unmarried with children 26.748 1,155.420 7,041.131
without children 11.616 354.682 15,956.796
Source: Authors' computations from EU-SILC data (2007-2008)
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